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Abstract 
Our research addresses fundamental long-standing concerns in the compensating 
wage differentials literature and its public policy implications: the econometric properties 
of estimates of the value of statistical life (VSL) and the wide range of such estimates 
from about $0 to almost $30 million. Here we address most of the prominent econometric 
issues by applying panel data, a new and more accurate fatality risk measure, and 
systematic application of panel data estimators. Controlling for measurement error, 
endogeneity, latent individual heterogeneity that may be correlated with the regressors, 
state dependence, and sample composition yields an estimated value of a statistical life of 
about $7 million–$12 million, which we show can clarify greatly the cost-effectiveness of 
regulatory decisions. We show that probably the most important econometric issue is 
controlling for latent heterogeneity; less important is how one does it. 
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1. Introduction 
The value of statistical life (VSL) concept based on econometric estimates of 
wage-fatality risk tradeoffs in the labor market is well established in the economics 
literature. The method provides the yardstick that the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) requires agencies to use in valuing fatality risks reduced by regulatory 
programs.1
We begin with an econometric framework that is a slight extension of the usual 
hedonic wage equation used in the value of statistical life literature. For worker i (i = 
1,…,N) in industry j (j = 1,…,J) and occupation k (k = 1,…,K) at time t (t = 1,…,T) the 
hedonic tradeoff between the wage and risk of fatality is described by 
 
 More recently, VSL estimates have also provided the basis for assessing a 
broad range of issues from the mortality costs of the Iraq war (Wallsten and Kosec 2005, 
Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006) to a refined measurement of economic growth (Jena, Mulligan, 
Philipson, and Sun 2008). Notwithstanding the wide use of the VSL approach, there is 
still concern over excessively large/small estimates and the wide range of VSL estimates. 
One approach to dealing with the dispersion of VSL estimates, which has been used by 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, has been to rely on meta analyses of the labor 
market VSL literature. Our research demonstrates how using the best available data and 
econometric practices affects the estimated VSL so as to narrow the range of estimates.  
0 0 1ln ijkt i i jkt ijkt ijktw X uα α α π β
+ −= + + + + , (1) 
where ln wijkt is the natural log of the hourly wage rate; πjkt is the industry and occupation 
specific fatality rate; Xijkt is a vector containing dummy variables for the worker’s one-
digit occupation (and industry in some specifications), state and region of residence, plus 
                                                 
1 See U.S. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis (Sept. 17, 2003) which is 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf. 
  
the usual demographic variables: worker education, age and age squared, race, marital 
status, and union status;  uijkt is an error term allowing conditional heteroskedasticity and 
within industry by occupation autocorrelation.2
0( )iα
+
 Equation (1) is slightly unfamiliar as it 
contains two latent individual effects: one that is positively correlated with wages and the 
fatality rate  and one that is positively correlated with wages and negatively 
correlated with the fatality rate 0( )iα
− . The first individual effect reflects unmeasured job 
productivity that leads more productive/higher wage workers to take safer jobs and the 
second individual effect reflects unmeasured individual differences in personal safety 
productivity that leads higher wage workers to take what appears to be more dangerous 
jobs because the true danger level for such a worker is lower than the measured fatality 
rate. Our research uses equation (1) in conjunction with a variety of econometric 
techniques, which demonstrates the capabilities of individual panel data that incorporate 
fatality risk measures that vary by year. 
To set the stage, an extremely wide range of labor market VSL estimates from 
micro cross-section data has generated a series of prominent econometric controversies 
reviewed by Viscusi and Aldy (2003). Hedonic equilibrium in the labor market means 
that equation (1) traces out the locus of labor market equilibria involving the offer curves 
of firms and the supply curves of workers. A salient concern in estimating and 
interpreting equation (1) involves the fatality risk variable, which ideally should serve as 
a measure of the risk beliefs of workers and firms for the particular job. Broadly defined 
risk measures, such as those pertinent to one’s industry or general occupation, may 
                                                 
2 We adopt a parametric specification of the regression model representing hedonic equilibrium in (1) for 
comparison purposes with the existing literature. An important emerging line of research is how more 
econometrically free-form representations of hedonic labor markets facilitates identification of  underlying 
fundamentals, which would further generalize estimates of VSL (Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim 2004). 
  
involve substantial measurement error. Other concerns are over the potential endogeneity 
of the job risk measure (Ashenfelter and Greenstone 2004a) and possible state 
dependence in wages (MaCurdy 2007). Here we will exploit the capabilities of a very 
refined risk measure defined over time and by occupation and industry, coupled with 
panel data on workers’ labor market decisions, to resolve many prominent issues in the 
hedonic labor market literature. Because our focus is on the average VSL across a broad 
sample of workers, we will consequently not explore emerging interest in the 
heterogeneity of VSL by age and other personal characteristics (Kniesner, Viscusi, and 
Ziliak 2006; Aldy and Viscusi 2008). 
 We devote particular attention to measurement errors, which have been noted in 
Black and Kniesner (2003), Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004b), and Ashenfelter (2006). 
Although we do not have information on subjective risk beliefs, we use very detailed data 
on objective risk measures and consider the possibility that workers are driven by risk 
expectations. Published industry risk beliefs are strongly correlated with subjective risk 
values,3
We address the pivotal issue of measurement error in several ways. The fatality 
risk variable is not by industry or occupation alone, as is the norm in almost all previous 
studies, but is a refined measure based on 720 industry-occupation cells. We use not only 
one-year but also three-year averages to reduce the influence of random year-to-year 
 and we follow the standard practice of matching to workers in the sample an 
objective risk measure. Where we differ from most previous studies is the pertinence of 
the risk data to the worker’s particular job, and ours is the first study to account for the 
variation of the more pertinent risk level within the context of a panel data study. 
                                                 
3  See Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a review. 
  
fluctuations.4
As mentioned earlier, potential biases in VSL estimates can arise from unmodeled 
worker productivity and safety-related productivity as reflected in 
 Because the fatality rate data are available by year, workers in our panel 
who do not change jobs can also have a different fatality risk in different years. In 
contrast, the only previous panel-based labor market VSL study used the same 
occupational risk measure based on the 1967 Society of Actuaries data for 37 narrowly 
defined high risk occupations for all years, so that all possible variation in risk was 
restricted to workers who changed occupations (Brown 1980). Our research also explores 
using adjacent observation differences as well as longer differences, for which the 
influence of measurement error should be less pronounced (Griliches and Hausman 
1986). In addition, we examine how instrumental variable estimates for each approach 
attenuates measurement error and endogeneity bias. Finally, our rational expectations and 
dynamic first-difference models’ estimates make it possible to include longer-run worker 
adaptations to changes in their job risk level that may occur if they are not perfectly 
informed about the risk initially. 
0( )iα
+  and 0( )iα
−
 in 
equation (1) (Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard 1992; Viscusi and Hersch 2001; Shogren and 
Stamland 2002). Panel data allow the researcher to sweep out all such time invariant 
individual effects and to infer their relative importance in terms of biasing VSL if ignored 
econometrically. In each instance, we use the pertinent instrumental variables estimator. 
Our work also distinguishes job movers from job stayers. We find that most of the 
variation in risk and most of the evidence of positive VSLs stems from people changing 
                                                 
4 The only previous use of the fatality rate data at our level of disaggregation and for different periods of 
time is in Viscusi (2004). Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak (2006) also used the 720 cell measure but not the 
multi-year averages. Neither study employed panel-data econometric techniques. 
  
jobs across occupations or industries possibly endogenously rather than from variation in 
risk levels over time in a given job setting. 
Our econometric refinements using panel data have a substantial effect on the 
estimated VSL levels. They reduce the estimated VSL by more than 50 percent from the 
implausibly large cross-section PSID-based VSLs of $20–30 million. We demonstrate 
how systematic econometric modeling narrows the estimated value of a statistical life 
from about $0–$30 million to about $7 million–$12 million, which we then show clarifies 
the choice of the proper labor market based VSL for policy evaluations. 
2. Panel Data Econometric Framework 
 Standard panel-data estimators permitting latent worker-specific heterogeneity 
through person-specific intercepts in equation (1) are the deviation from time-mean 
(within) estimator and the time-difference (first- and long-differences) estimators. The 
fixed effects include all person-specific time-invariant differences in tastes and all aspects 
of productivity, which may be correlated with the regressors in X. The two estimators 
yield identical results when there are two time periods and when the number of periods 
converges towards infinity. With a finite number of periods (T > 2), estimates from the 
two different fixed-effects estimators can diverge due to possible non-stationarity in 
wages, measurement error, or model misspecification (Wooldridge 2002). Because wages 
from longitudinal data on individuals have been shown to be non-stationary in other 
contexts (Abowd and Card 1989; MaCurdy 2007), we adopt the first-difference model as 
a baseline. 
 The first-difference model eliminates time-invariant effects by estimating the 
changes over time in hedonic equilibrium 
  
   1ln ijkt jkt ijkt ijktw X uα π β∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ ,    (2) 
where ∆  refers to the first-difference operator (Weiss and Lillard 1978). 
 The first-difference model could exacerbate errors-in-variables problems relative 
to the within model (Griliches and Hausman 1986). If the fatality rate is measured with a 
classical error, then the first-difference estimate of 1α̂  may be attenuated relative to the 
within estimate. An advantage of the regression specification in equation (2), which 
considers intertemporal changes in hedonic equilibrium outcomes, arises because we can 
use so-called wider (2+ year) differences. If ∆ ≥ 2 then measurement error effects are 
mitigated in equation (2) relative to within-differences regression (Griliches and 
Hausman 1986; Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner 2007). As discussed in the data section 
below, we additionally address the measurement error issue in the fatality rate by 
employing multi-year averages of fatalities. For completeness we also note how the first-
difference and longer-differences estimates compare to the within estimates. 
 Lillard and Weiss (1979) demonstrated that earnings functions may not only have 
idiosyncratic differences in levels but also have idiosyncratic differences in growth. To 
correct for wages that may not be difference stationary as implied by equation (2) we 
estimate a double differenced version of equation (2) that is  
  2 2 2 21ln ijkt jkt ijkt ijktw X uα π β∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ ,    (3) 
where 2 1t t−∆ = ∆ −∆ , commonly known as the difference-in-difference operator. 
Finally, we also estimate a dynamic version of equation (2) by adding γ∆ ln wijkt−1 
to the right-hand side and using two first-difference instrumental variables estimators: (i) 
using the two-period lagged level of the dependent variable as an identifying instrument 
for the one-period lagged difference in the dependent variable (Greene 2008, Chapter 15) 
  
and (ii) using an instrument set that grows as the time-series dimension of the panel 
evolves (Arellano and Bond 1991). The lagged dependent variable controls for additional 
heterogeneity and serial correlation plus sluggish adjustment to equilibrium (state 
dependence). We therefore compare the estimated short-run effect, 1α̂ , to the estimated 
long-run effect, 1ˆ ˆ/(1 )α γ− , and their associated VSLs. 
2.1 Comparison Estimators 
If [ | , ] 0ijk jk ijkE u Xπ =  and 
,
0[ | , ] 0i jk ijkE Xα π
+ − = , which are the zero conditional 
mean assumptions of least squares regression, then OLS estimation of the hedonic 
equilibrium in equation (1) using pooled cross-section time-series data is consistent. If 
the zero conditional mean assumption holds, which is unlikely to be the case, then the 
two basic estimators frequently employed with panel data, the between-groups estimator 
and the random-effects estimator, will yield consistent coefficient estimates. 
The between-groups estimator is a cross-sectional estimator using individuals’ 
time-means of the variables 
 1ln ijk jk ijk ijkw X uα π β δ= + + + ,     (4) 
with 
1
1ln ln
T
ijk ijkt
t
w w
T =
= ∑ and other variables similarly defined. A potential advantage of 
the between-groups estimator is that measurement-error induced attenuation bias in 
estimated coefficients may be reduced because averaging smoothes the data generating 
process. Because measurement error affects estimates of the VSL (Black and Kniesner 
2003; Ashenfelter 2006), the between-groups estimator should provide improved 
estimates of the wage-fatal risk tradeoff over pooled time-series cross-section OLS 
estimates of equation (1). 
  
 The random-effects model differs from the OLS model in equation (1) by explicit 
inclusion of the latent heterogeneity terms, 0 0,i iα α
+ − , in the model’s error structure, but is 
similar to OLS in that this additional source of error is also treated as exogenous to the 
fatality risk and other demographic variables. The implication is that selection into 
possibly risky occupations and industries on the basis of unobserved productivity and 
tastes is purely random across the population of workers. Although both the pooled least 
squares and between-groups estimators remain consistent in the presence of random 
heterogeneity, the random-effects estimator will be more efficient because it accounts for 
person-specific autocorrelation in the wage process. The random-effects estimator is thus 
a weighted average of the between-groups variation and the within-groups variation. 
 Finally, suppose that selection into a particular industry and occupation is not 
random with respect to time-invariant unobserved productivity and risk preferences. In 
the non-random selection case, estimates of VSL based on the pooled cross-section, 
between-groups, or random-effects estimators will be biased and inconsistent; the  first-
differences and double-differences estimators in equations (2) and (3), as well as the 
dynamic first-difference estimator, can be consistent despite non-random job switching. 
2.2 Research Objective 
The focal parameter of interest in each of the regression models we estimate is 
1ˆ ,α  which is used in constructing estimates of the value of a statistical life. Accounting 
for the fact that fatality risk is per 100,000 workers and that the typical work-year is 
about 2000 hours, the estimated value of a statistical life at the mean level of wages is  
   1
ˆ ˆ( ) 2000 100,000wVSL wα
π
∂ = = × × × ∂ 
.   (5) 
  
Although the VSL function in equation (5) can be evaluated at various points in the wage 
distribution, most studies report only the mean effect. To highlight the differences in 
estimates of the VSL with and without controls for unobserved individual differences, we 
follow the standard convention of focusing on VSL  in our estimates presented below. 
Our primary objective is to examine how following systematic econometric practices for 
panel data models reduces the estimated range of VSL. However, we also present 
estimates of the mean VSL using the sample average of hours worked, , in lieu of 2,000 
hours. In addition, we provide 95 percent confidence intervals around the mean VSL. 
3. Data and Sample Descriptions 
 The main body of our data come from the 1993–2001 waves of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), which provides individual-level data on wages, industry and 
occupation, and demographics. The PSID survey has followed a core set of households 
since 1968 plus newly formed households as members of the original core have split off 
into new families. 
3.1 PSID Sample 
 The sample we use consists of male heads of household ages 18–65 who are in 
the random Survey Research Center (SRC) portion of the PSID, and thus excludes the 
oversample of the poor in the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) and the Latino 
sub-sample. The male heads in our regressions (i) worked for hourly or salary pay at 
some point in the previous calendar year, (ii) are not permanently disabled or 
institutionalized, (iii) are not in agriculture or the armed forces, (iv) have a real hourly 
  
wage greater than $2 per hour and less than $100 per hour, and (v) have no missing data 
on wages, education, region, industry, and occupation. 
Beginning in 1997 the PSID moved to every other year interviewing. For 
consistent spacing of survey response we use data from the 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 
2001 waves. The use of every other year responses will be one of many mechanisms to 
reduce the influence of measurement error in our estimated VSL. We do not require 
individuals to be present for the entire sample period; we have an unbalanced panel 
where we take missing values as random events.5
 The focal variable from the PSID in our models of hedonic labor market 
equilibrium is the hourly wage rate. For workers paid by the hour the survey records the 
gross hourly wage rate. The interviewer asks salaried workers how frequently they are 
paid, such as weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly. The interviewer then norms a salaried 
worker's pay by a fixed number of hours worked depending on the pay period. For 
example, salary divided by 40 is the hourly wage rate constructed for a salaried worker 
paid weekly. We deflate the nominal wage by the personal consumption expenditure 
deflator for 2001 base year. We then take the natural log of the real wage rate to 
minimize the influence of outliers and for ease of comparison with others’ estimates. 
 Our sample filters yield 2,036 men and 
6,625 person-years. About 40 percent of the men are present for all five waves (nine 
years); another 25 percent are present for at least four waves. 
 The demographic controls in the model include years of formal education, a 
quadratic in age, dummy variables for state of residence, dummy indicators for region of 
country (northeast, north central, and west with south the omitted region), race (white = 
                                                 
5 Ziliak and Kniesner (1998) show that when there is nonrandom attrition our differenced data models 
should remove it along with the other time-invariant factors. 
  
1), union status (coverage = 1), marital status (married = 1), and one-digit occupation. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics. 
3.2 Fatality Risk Measures 
 We use the fatality rate for the worker’s two-digit industry by one-digit 
occupation group. We distinguished 720 industry-occupation groups using a breakdown 
of 72 two-digit SIC code industries and the 10 one-digit occupational groups. After 
constructing codes for two-digit industry by one-digit occupation in the PSID we then 
matched each worker to the relevant industry-occupation fatality risk. We constructed a 
worker fatality risk variable using proprietary U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data from 
the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) for 1992–2002.6
 The CFOI provides the most comprehensive inventory to date of all work-related 
fatalities in a given year. The CFOI data come from reports by the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration, workers’ compensation reports, death certificates, and 
medical examiner reports. To be classified as a work-related injury the decedent must 
have been employed at the time of the fatal event and engaged in legal work activity that 
required the worker be present at the site of the fatal incident. In each case the BLS 
verifies the work status of the decedent with two or more of the above source documents 
or with a follow-up questionnaire in conjunction with a source document.  
 
 The underlying assumption in our research and almost the entire hedonic 
literature more generally is that the subjective risk assessments by workers and firms can 
                                                 
6 The fatality data can be obtained on CD-ROM via a confidential agreement with the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Our variable construction procedure follows that in Viscusi (2004), which describes the 
properties of the 720 industry-occupation breakdown in greater detail. In our basic estimation sample we 
limit observations to those where the annual change in fatality risk is no less than −75 percent and no more 
than +300 per cent. In our subsequent robustness checks in Table 8 we examine what happens to VSL if we 
apply the same screen to the three-year change or eliminate the screen completely. 
  
be captured by objective measures of the risk. Workers and firms use available 
information about the nature of the job and possibly the accident record itself in forming 
risk beliefs. The models do not assume that workers and firms are aware of the published 
risk measures at any point in time. Rather, the objective measures serve as a proxy for the 
subjective beliefs. Previous research reviewed in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) has indicated a 
strong correlation between workers’ subjective risk beliefs and published injury rates. 
Because our fatality risk variable is by industry and by occupation, it will provide a much 
more pertinent measure of the risk associated with a particular job than a more broadly 
based index, such as the industry risk alone, which is the most widely used job risk 
variable. For example, miners and secretaries in the coal mining industry face quite 
different risks, so that taking into account the occupation as well as the industry as we do 
here substantially reduces the measurement error in the fatality risk variable. 
 The importance of the industry-occupation structure of our risk variable is 
especially great within the context of a panel data analysis. The previous panel study by 
Brown (1980) used a time-invariant fatality risk measure for 37 relatively high risk 
occupations. By using a fatality risk variable that varies over time and is defined for 720 
industry-occupation groups, we greatly expand the observed variance in workers’ job 
risks across different periods.  
We construct two measures of fatal risk, which differ according to the numerator. 
The first measure simply uses the number of fatalities in each industry-occupation cell. 
The second measure uses a three-year average of fatalities surrounding each PSID survey 
year (1992–1994 for the 1993 wave, 1994–1996 for the 1995 wave, and so on). The 
denominator for each measure used to construct the fatality risk is the number of 
  
employees for that industry-occupation group in survey year t. Both of our two measures 
of the fatality risk are time-varying because of changes in both the numerator and the 
denominator.7
We expect there to be less measurement error in the 3-year average fatality rates 
relative to the annual rate because the averaging process will reduce the influence of 
random fluctuations in fatalities as well as mitigate the small sample problems that arise 
from many narrowly defined job categories. We also expect less reporting error in the 
industry information than in the occupation information, so even our annual measure 
should have less measurement error than if the worker’s occupation were the basis for 
matching (Mellow and Sider 1983, Black and Kniesner 2003). But to further reduce the 
influence of large swings in fatality risk, we drop person-years where the percentage 
change in fatality risk exceeds a positive 300 percent or negative 75 percent. Table 1 lists 
the means and standard deviations for both fatality risk measures. The sample mean 
fatality risk for the annual measure is 6.4/100,000. As expected, the variation in the 
annual measure exceeds that of the 3-year average. 
 
 Our research also avoids a problem plaguing past attempts to estimate the wage-
fatal risk tradeoff with panel data. If the fatality rate is an aggregate by industry or 
occupation the within or first-difference transformation leaves little variation in the 
fatality risk measure to identify credibly the fatality parameter. Most of the variation in 
aggregate fatality risk is of the so-called between-groups variety (across occupations or 
industries at a point in time) and not of the within-groups variety (within either 
occupations or industries over time). Although between-group variation exceeds within-
                                                 
7 We used the bi-annual employment averages from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population 
Survey, unpublished table, Table 6, Employed Persons by Detailed Industry and Occupation for 1993–
2001.  
  
group variation (Table 2), the within variation in our more disaggregate measures is 
sufficiently large (about 33–40 percent of the between variation) so that it may be 
feasible to identify the fatal risk parameter and VSL in our panel data models. Finally, we 
also address the issue that between-group variation in fatality risk may be generated by 
endogenous job switching. 
4. Wage Equation Estimates 
 Although we suppress the coefficients for ease of presentation, each regression 
model we use controls for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, 
marital status, union status, race, and one-digit occupation. Because of the substantial 
heterogeneity of jobs in different occupations, the regressions include a set of one-digit 
occupation dummies. In addition, because there might be unmeasured differences in labor 
markets across states that do not vary with time, we include a full set of state fixed 
effects. Likewise, workers in a given year may face common macroeconomic shocks to 
wages, and so we include a vector of year dummies in all models. However, our baseline 
estimating equations do not include industry dummy variables as well because doing so 
could introduce substantial multicollinearity with respect to the fatality risk variable, 
which involves matching workers to fatality risk based on their industry and occupation. 
(In our subsequent robustness checks we add  industry dummies.) Reported standard 
errors are clustered by industry and occupation and are also robust to the relevant 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Note that our first-difference regressions 
automatically net out the influence of industry and other job characteristics that do not 
change over time, and the double-difference regressions net out additional trending 
factors.  
  
Because our primary focus is on the panel estimates, we do not include regressors 
that exhibit little variation across the time periods. Within the panel data context workers’ 
compensation benefit levels are fixed in real terms for most workers. The main benefit 
measures that have been used in the hedonic literature pertain to the weekly benefit level 
for temporary partial disability. The associated wage replacement rate changed for only 
five states during the nine years of our data, and the changes were minor. There is also 
not much variation across states in replacement rates. For half the states the replacement 
rate is at two-thirds of the worker’s wage, and many other states have similar time-
invariant replacement rates such as 70 percent. States exhibit greater variation with 
respect to the maximum weekly benefits that will be paid for temporary partial disability. 
However, the benefit maximums tend to increase steadily over time, reflecting 
adjustments for price inflation. Indeed, during 1992–2001, 34 states had benefit growth 
rates that were confined to a 1.7 percent growth rate band surrounding the rate of price 
inflation. Thus, with the panel data context workers’ compensation benefit levels will 
tend to be fixed for most workers in the sample, and we do not include a workers’ 
compensation variable. However, to the extent that there is cross-state variation in benefit 
levels these differences will be absorbed in our controls for state fixed effects.  
4.1 Focal Estimates from Panel Data 
 The baseline first-difference estimates from equation (2) appear in Table 3. The 
results begin our attempt to address systematically not only latent heterogeneity and 
possibly trended regressors, but also measurement error. Comparing estimates both down 
a column and across a row reveals the effect of measurement error. The results are 
reasonable from both an econometric and economic perspective and provide the 
  
comparison point for our core research issue, which is how badly VSL can be mis-
represented if certain basic econometric issues are mis-handled. 
 The VSL implied by the baseline model’s coefficient for the annual fatality rate in 
Table 3 using the sample mean wage of $21 in (5) is $6.9 million, with a confidence 
interval of $6.8 million–$7.1 million.8
2001 1993ln lnw w−
 We emphasize that a novel aspect of our research 
is that it helps clarify the size of possible measurement error effects. If measurement error 
in fatality risk is random it will attenuate coefficient estimates and should be reduced by 
letting the fatality rate encompass a wider time interval. Compared to VSL from the more 
typical annual risk measure, the estimated VSL in Table 3 is about 13 percent larger when 
fatality risk is a three-year average. The last two columns of Table 3 report the results for 
widest possible differences ( ) as well as difference-in-differences from 
equation (3), which should remove possible spurious estimated effects from variables that 
are not difference stationary. The main message from Table 3 is that correcting for 
measurement error in most cases enlarges estimated VSL, and that even for the relatively 
basic panel models using differencing, the range for VSL is not uncomfortably large: 
about $7 million–$9 million when using a 2000 hour work year (CI = $6.8 million–$9.7 
million) and about $8 million–$10 million when using sample average hours to compute 
VSL (CI = $7.5 million–$10.9 million). 
 An issue seldom addressed in panel wage equations producing VSL is endogeneity 
of the fatality change regressor, which may result from dynamic decisions workers make 
to change jobs (Solon 1986, 1989; Spengler and Schaffner 2006). Some changes in 
fatality risk will occur because of within industry-occupation cell changes and others will 
                                                 
8 The confidence interval uses a first-order Taylor series expansion to estimate the variance of the mean 
VSL, which from equation (5) is ( )2 2 12 21ˆ ˆ( ) 2000 *100,000 * * ( ) ( )Var VSL w Var Var wα α= + . 
  
occur because workers switch industry-occupation cells. Within the context of potentially 
hazardous employment, much of the mobility stems from workers learning about the 
risks on the job and then quitting if the compensating differential is insufficient given that 
information (Viscusi 1979). Within the context of multi-period Bayesian decisions, a 
desire to switch does not require that workers initially underestimated the risk, as 
imprecise risk beliefs can also generate a greater willingness to incur job risks than is 
warranted by the mean risk level. Interestingly, for the job changers in our sample, 51 
percent switch to lower fatality risk jobs and 46 percent switch to higher fatality risk jobs 
so that on balance there is some effort to sort into safer employment. 
We examine the practical importance of job changing status for panel-based 
estimation in Table 4, where we stratify the data by whether ∆πt is due to within or 
between cell changes, including immediately before and after a worker changes cells. The 
main econometric contribution to compensating differentials for fatality risk comes from 
workers who generate differences in risk over time by switching industry-occupation 
cells. The difference in estimated VSL in Table 4 comes from the fact that 2
tπ
σ is at least 8 
times larger for switchers (see Table 2). There is too little within-cells variation to reveal 
much of a compensating differential for job stayers. More important, because so much of 
the variation producing the wage differential in Table 3 comes from job changers, and the 
variation for switchers may be related to wages, it is imperative to treat ∆π  as 
endogenous. 
 The estimated range for VSL narrows even further when we allow for endogeneity 
and instrument the change in fatality risk. The instrumental variables regressions in Table 
5 control for both classical measurement errors and endogeneity. Specifically, based on 
  
the results of Griliches and Hausman (1986) we interchangeably use the (t−1) and (t−3) 
levels of the fatality risk, or the (t−1) less (t−3) difference. We limit the focus to the 
annual fatality rate so as to have enough lagged fatality and fatality differences as 
instruments.9
Table 6 presents our final focal panel results from dynamic first-difference 
regressions. The short-run effects from the dynamic model appear in column 1 and the 
long-run (steady state) estimates appear in column 2. Note that our first-differences 
estimator focuses on changes in wages in response to changes in risk. The mechanism by 
which the changes will become reflected in the labor market hinges on how shifts in the 
risk level will affect the tangencies of the constant expected utility loci with the market 
offer curve. To the extent that the updating of risk beliefs occurs gradually over time, 
which is not unreasonable because even release of the government risk data is not 
contemporaneous, one would expect the long-run effects on wages of changes in job risk 
to exceed the short-run effects. Limitations on mobility will reinforce a lagged influence 
(state dependence). 
 The main result is a fairly narrow range for the estimated VSL, 
approximately $7 million–$8 million when we instrument the annual change in fatality 
risk (CI = $6.6–$8 million). 
As one would then expect, the steady state estimates of VSL after the estimated 
three-year adjustment period in the results in Table 6 are larger than the short-run 
estimates. The difference between the short-run and long-run VSL is about $2 million, 
ranging from $7 million–$8 million versus $9 million–$10 million using a standard work 
                                                 
9 Greene (2008, Chapter 15) notes  that the large sample variance of the dynamic difference estimator is 
smaller when lagged levels rather than lagged differences are part of the instruments, which here include all 
exogenous explanatory variables. The first-stage results here and in subsequent tables pass the standard 
weak instruments check based on a partial R2 of at least 0.10.  
  
year and about $8 million–$9 million versus about $10 million–$11 million using sample 
average annual hours worked. Again, the range of VSL estimates is not great when panel 
data are used with estimators that accommodate endogeneity, weak instruments, 
measurement error, latent heterogeneity and possible state dependence. 
4.2 Comparison Results From Cross-Section Estimators 
 Table 7 presents the comparison models that flesh out the most salient 
econometric issues when compared to the focal panel results from Tables 3–6 just 
presented. 
 One problematic result in the literature is the regularly occurring large value for 
VSL when the PSID is used as a cross-section (Viscusi and Aldy 2003). Notice that the 
cross-section estimators in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 produce large implied VSLs, about 
$16 million–$28 million. 
 In contrast, column 3 of Table 7 reports estimates from the panel random-effects 
estimator, where a Breusch-Pagan test supports heterogeneous intercepts. Recall that the 
random-effects estimator accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, which is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with observed covariates. It is fairly common in labor-market research to 
reject the assumption of no correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and observed 
covariates; and Hausman test results indicate a similar rejection here. The simple fixed 
effects within estimator in the last column is preferred over the simple random effects 
estimator, with an estimated VSL of about $6–$8 million. Allowing for the possibility of 
unobserved productivity and preferences for risk, even if it is improperly assumed to be 
randomly distributed in the population, reduces the estimated VSL by up to 60 percent 
relative to a model that ignores latent heterogeneity. 
  
The difference in estimated VSL with versus without latent individual 
heterogeneity in the model is consistent with the theoretical emphasis in Shogren and 
Stamland (2002) that failure to control for unobserved skill results in a potentially 
substantial upward bias in the estimated VSL. Taking into account the influence of 
individual heterogeneity implies that, on balance, unobservable person-specific 
differences in safety-related productivity and risk preferences are a more powerful 
influence than unobservable productivity generally, which Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard 
(1992) hypothesize to have the opposite effect. 
4.3 Panel Data Estimator Specification Checks 
 As a final dimension of our research we present Tables 8–10, which contain 
results from an extensive set of specification checks designed to examine whether the 
level and range of VSL from panel data discussed thus far are sensitive to the many 
options the researcher has in estimating a linear panel model. In particular, we further 
explore the importance of econometric modeling choices for covariates, endogeneity, 
dynamics, expectations, and sample composition in panel data based estimates of VSL. 
 The results of Table 8 show little effect on VSL from whether or not one trims the 
set of observations by the size of change in fatality rates between observation years or 
adds an additional control for industry. What matters more to the size of VSL is how the 
researcher addresses injury risk expectations and wage dynamics, which we now discuss. 
 It is possible that workers base their willingness to work in a given setting on an 
expected rather than actual observed fatality risk. A simple econometric implementation 
of the expectations possibility would be to use the lagged fatality measure rather than a 
concurrent fatality measure as the focal regressor, which is the set of results in the first 
  
column of Table 8. Direct substitution of a lagged regressor is also a simple IV estimator 
for an endogenous fatality regressor. The simple substitution of lagged fatality lowers the 
estimated VSL to $4 million–$6 million (CI = $3.4 million–$5.9 million). To be fair, one 
should also check more sophisticated representations of expectations such as rational 
expectations, that are IV estimates using multiple fatality lags, which are the 
specifications in Tables 5 and 9. When we estimate more sophisticated rational 
expectations type models with multiple lagged values as instruments, as in Table 9, the 
comparison results are similar to our earlier findings: the model passes the standard weak 
instrument check and VSL is about $7 million–$9 million using a standard (2000 hour) 
work year and about $8 million–$10 million using the higher sample average work year. 
 Our final comparison model is the most complex econometric approach, which is 
the Arellano-Bond dynamic first differences model. In the previously discussed IV 
models that include dynamics presented in Table 6 the instrument set for the lagged wage 
regressor always contains two (further) lagged values. In the Arellano-Bond model 
lagged values of wages are instruments but the instrument set grows as the sample 
evolves temporally so that the last time period observation has the most instruments and 
the earliest time period observation has the fewest instruments.10
5. Implications for Regulatory Cost-Effectiveness 
 The Arellano-Bond 
results in Table 10 produce VSLs that are about the same or a little higher than the 
dynamic models that use much smaller temporally fixed instrument sets, as in Table 6. 
 Obtaining reliable estimates of compensating differential equations has long been 
challenging because of the central roles of individual heterogeneity and state dependence 
                                                 
10 The Arellano-Bond model has also proved useful in studying  job injury risk is the outcome of interest. 
See Kniesner and Leeth (2004). 
  
in affecting both the market offer curve and individual preferences. The often conflicting 
influence of different unobservable factors has led to competing theories with predictions 
of different direction. 
The wide variation of VSL estimates in the literature also has generated concern 
that underlying econometric problems may jeopardize the validity of those estimates. The 
range for VSL in the existing literature is extremely wide, from about $0 million to $20 
million. Previous studies using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics have often yielded 
extremely high VSL estimates of $20+ million, which is also the case in our own cross-
section based estimates with the PSID. Earlier research did not control for the host of 
econometric problems we address here. A most important finding here is that controlling 
for latent time-invariant heterogeneity is crucial – much more so than how one does it 
econometrically. 
Our first-difference estimation results use more refined fatality risk measures than 
employed in earlier studies control for measurement errors and workplace safety 
endogeneity in econometric specifications considering state dependence, expectations 
and heterogeneity when examining the wage-fatality risk tradeoff. Comparison of the 
various first-difference results with various cross-section estimates implies that 
controlling for latent worker-specific heterogeneity reduces the estimated VSL by as 
much as two-thirds and narrows greatly the VSL range to about $7 million–$12 million 
depending on the time-frame (short-run versus long-run) and work year (standard or 
sample average) in the calculation. 
Narrowing VSL as we do here has substantial benefits for policy evaluation. In its 
Budget Circular A4 (Sept. 17, 2003), the U.S. Office of Management and Budget requires 
  
that agencies indicate the range of uncertainty around key parameter values used in 
benefit-cost assessments. Attempting to bound the VSL based on a meta analysis 
produces a wide range of estimates from nearly $0 to $20+ million. In addition to the 
issue of what studies should be included in the meta analysis given the differences in data 
sets, specifications, and study quality, we can also produce VSLs that mimic the literature 
with ones as low as $0 if we limit the sample to workers who never change jobs and ones 
as high as $28 million if we use the between estimator with the PSID as a cross-section 
(CI = −$5.4 million–$28.1 million). As a consequence of the perceived indeterminacies 
in VSL, agencies often have failed to provide any boundaries at all to the key VSL 
parameter in their benefit assessments. 
The advantage of using our VSL range in policy assessments can be illustrated by 
an example of the cost-effectiveness of U.S. health and safety regulations. Using the 
widely cited cost estimates from the U.S. Office of Management and Budget cited by 
Breyer (1993), among others, and updating the values to $2001 to be consistent with our 
VSL estimates, we illustrate the reduction of policy uncertainty achievable by application 
of our estimates. Applying the meta analysis VSL range, 10 policies pass a benefit-cost 
test, 20 fail a benefit-cost test, and 23 are in the indeterminate zone. Using our estimated 
VSL range, the distributions becomes 27 policies that clearly pass a benefit-cost test, 23 
that fail a benefit-cost test, with only 3 policies in the indeterminate range. Our narrowing 
of the acceptable cost-per-life-saved range greatly reduces the range of indeterminacy 
and is of substantial practical consequence given the actual distribution of regulatory 
policy performance. 
  
From a more conceptual standpoint, our research has resolved the econometric 
issues giving rise to the very high/low levels and wide ranges of published VSL estimates. 
The disparate results in previous studies may reflect the influence of omitted 
unobservable effects, among other repairable econometric specification errors. Failure to 
address the underlying econometric issues may have produced continuing controversy in 
the economics literature over the hedonic method and unduly muddled the policy debate 
over the use of VSL estimates in benefit calculations for government policies. 
  
 
 
 
Table 1:  Selected Summary Statistics 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Real Hourly Wage 20.610 13.041 
Log Real Hourly Wage 2.862 0.566 
Age 40.832 8.452 
Marital Status (1=Married) 0.817 0.386 
Race (1=White) 0.758 0.428 
Union (1=member) 0.230 0.421 
Years of Schooling 13.506 2.221 
Live in Northeast 0.172 0.378 
Live in Northcentral 0.283 0.451 
Live in South 0.376 0.484 
Live in West 0.168 0.374 
   
One-Digit Industry Groups:   
Mining 0.008 0.089 
Construction 0.127 0.333 
Manufacturing 0.231 0.421 
Transportation and Public Utilities 0.115 0.319 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.139 0.346 
Fire, Insurance, and Real Estate 0.045 0.206 
Business and Repair Services 0.070 0.256 
Personal Services 0.010 0.098 
Entertainment and Professional Services 0.188 0.391 
Public Administration 0.067 0.250 
   
One-Digit Occupation Groups:   
Executive and Managerial 0.191 0.393 
Professional 0.158 0.365 
Technicians 0.042 0.202 
Sales 0.031 0.174 
Administrative Support 0.050 0.219 
Services 0.082 0.274 
Precision Production Crafts 0.231 0.421 
Machine Operators 0.079 0.270 
Transportation 0.090 0.286 
Handlers and Labors 0.046 0.209 
   
Annual Fatality Rate (per 100,000) 6.415 9.144 
3-Year Fatality Rate (per 100,000) 5.716 8.390 
   
Number of Men = 2,036   
Number of Person Years = 6,625     
 
  
 
Table 2:  Between and Within Group Variation for Industry by 
Occupation Fatality Rates 
    
 
Overall 
Variance 
Between 
Group 
Variance 
Within 
Group 
Variance 
Annual Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 69.866 50.447 19.419 
3-Year Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 52.077 39.401 12.676 
    
    
Never Change Industry-Occupation    
Annual Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 71.646 68.356 3.290 
3-Year Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 52.458 51.629 0.828 
    
Ever Change Industry-Occupation    
Annual Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 69.094 42.799 26.295 
3-Year Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 51.914 34.189 17.726 
    
Only When Change Industry-Occupation    
Annual Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 70.591 46.240 24.351 
3-Year Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 64.927 43.908 21.019 
    
 
  
 
Table 3: First-Difference Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff 
  
Static First 
Difference 
Estimates 
First-Difference 
Estimator for 
2001minus1993  
Difference in 
Differences 
Estimator 
     
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000  1.6007 1.9438 1.4851 
  (0.4793) (1.7223) (0.5196) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions)  6.9 9.1 6.7 
95% CI  [6.8, 7.1] [8.5, 9.7] [6.5, 6.9] 
 VSL - using average hours  7.9 10.2 7.7 
95% CI  [7.7, 8.1] [9.5, 10.9] [7.5, 7.9] 
     
Number of Person-Years  4338 1017 2788 
     
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000  1.7785 1.8627 1.8567 
  (0.5435) (1.5412) (0.6339) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions)  7.8 8.8 8.5 
95% CI  [7.7, 8.0] [8.3, 9.3] [8.3, 8.7] 
 VSL - using average hours  9.0 9.9 9.8 
95% CI  [8.8, 9.1] [9.3, 10.5] [9.5, 10.0] 
     
Number of Person-Years  4916 1171 2992 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a 
quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-
digit occupation, state, and year effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in 
the table are divided by 1,000. 95% Confidence Intervals are constructed based on a 1st order 
Taylor series expansion. 
  
 
Table 4: Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff by Job Change Status 
  
Static First-
Difference 
First-Difference 
Estimator for 2001 
minus 1993  
Never Change Industry-Occupation    
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 0.1234 0.3097  
 (1.4164) (3.0008)  
    
Implied VSL ($Millions) 0.6 1.6  
 [0.2, 0.9] [-0.2, 3.4]  
 VSL - using average hours 0.7 1.8  
 [0.2, 1.1] [-0.3, 3.9]  
    
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 -0.8074 0.5758  
 (3.4029) (5.0319)  
    
Implied VSL ($Millions) -3.8 3.0  
 [-4.7, -3.0] [0.0, 6.0]  
 VSL - using average hours -4.4 3.4  
 [-5.4, -3.4] [0.0, 6.9]  
    
Number of Person-Years 1303 / 1390 282 / 296   
Ever Change Industry-Occupation    
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.6405 1.9125  
 (0.5088) (1.7859)  
    
Implied VSL ($Millions) 6.8 8.6  
 [6.7, 7.0] [7.9, 9.3]  
 VSL - using average hours 7.8 9.6  
 [7.6, 8.0] [8.8, 10.4]  
    
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.9845 1.8399  
 (0.5776) (1.5713)  
    
Implied VSL ($Millions) 8.3 8.4  
 [8.1, 8.5] [7.8, 9.0]  
 VSL - using average hours 9.4 9.4  
 [9.2, 9.7] [8.7, 10.1]  
    
Number of Person-Years 3035 735 / 868   
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for 
a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, 
one-digit occupation, state, and year effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the 
coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 95% Confidence Intervals are constructed based 
on a 1st order Taylor series expansion. 
 
  
Table 4 cont: Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff by Job Change Status 
  
Static First-
Difference 
First-Difference Estimator for 
2001 minus 1993    
Only When Change Industry-Occupation   
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.6607 1.7111  
 (0.5471) (1.8036)  
    
Implied VSL ($Millions) 6.9 7.4  
 [6.7, 7.1] [6.7, 8.1]  
 VSL - using average hours 7.8 8.2  
 [7.6, 8.1] [7.4, 9.0]  
    
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.9156 1.6764  
 (0.5660) (1.5877)  
    
Implied VSL ($Millions) 8.2 7.4  
 [7.9, 8.4] [6.7, 8.0]  
 VSL - using average hours 9.3 8.2  
 [9.0, 9.5] [7.5, 8.9]  
    
Number of Person-Years 1920 / 2261 597 / 699   
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a 
quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-
digit occupation, state, and year effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients 
in the table are divided by 1,000. 95% Confidence Intervals are constructed based on a 1st order 
Taylor series expansion. 
 
  
 
Table 5: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff 
 
First-Difference IV 
Estimator, t−1 and t−3  
Fatality as Instruments 
First-Difference IV 
Estimator, Lag Differenced 
Fatality as Instrument 
   
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.5574 1.5926 
 (0.6412) (0.6429) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) 6.7 6.9 
95% CI [6.6, 6.9] [6.7, 7.0] 
 VSL - using average hours 7.7 7.9 
95% CI [7.5, 7.9] [7.7, 8.0] 
   
First Stage Results   
   
t−1 fatality rate 0.7752  
 (0.0118)  
   
t−3 fatality rate -0.7553  
 (0.0118)  
   
(t−1 rate) − (t−3 rate)  0.7653 
  (0.0108) 
   
R2 0.63 0.63 
Partial R2 0.54 0.54 
Robust Wald {p-value} 106 {0.00} 163 {0.00} 
Number of Person-Years 4338 4338 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls 
for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, 
race, one-digit occupation, state, and year effects. First stage regressions include all 
exogenous explanatory variables in addition to the noted instruments. To construct the VSL 
using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 95% Confidence 
Intervals are constructed based on a 1st order Taylor series expansion. 
  
 
Table 6: Dynamic First Difference Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff 
  Dynamic First-Difference Estimates 
  with lag differenced wage instrumented 
      
  Short-Run Effect Long-Run Effect 
    
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000  1.6023 1.9546 
  (0.5346) [0.039] 
    
Implied VSL ($Millions)  7.2 8.8 
95% CI  [7.1, 7.4] [8.6, 9.1] 
 VSL - using average hours  8.3 10.2 
95% CI  [8.1, 8.6] [9.9, 10.4] 
    
First Stage Partial R2  0.15  
Robust Wald {p-value}  230,100 {0.00}  
Number of Person-Years  2788 
    
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000  1.7427 2.2164 
  (0.6175) [0.062] 
    
Implied VSL ($Millions)  8.0 10.2 
95% CI  [7.8, 8.2] [10.0, 10.5] 
 VSL - using average hours  9.2 11.7 
95% CI  [9.0, 9.5] [11.4, 12.0] 
    
First Stage Partial R2  0.15  
Robust Wald {p-value}  75,527 {0.00}  
Number of Person-Years   3162 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses and p-values of the null hypothesis that 
the long-run effect is zero are recorded in square brackets. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for 
a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, 
one-digit occupation, state, and year effects. One and two period lags of the independent 
variables, except for the fatality rates, are included as instruments for the lag wage. To 
construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are constructed based on a 1st order Taylor series expansion. 
 
  
 
Table 7:  Cross Section and Panel Data Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff 
  
Pooled Cross 
Section Time 
Series 
Estimator 
Between-
Group 
Estimator 
Random-
Effects 
Estimator 
Fixed-Effects 
Estimator 
     
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 4.625 5.9552 2.6043 1.7979 
 (1.2082) (1.5108) (0.5950) (0.6339) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions) 19.1 24.5 10.7 7.4 
95% CI [18.8, 19.4] [24.1, 25.0] [10.6, 10.9] [7.3, 7.5] 
 VSL - using average hours 21.5 27.6 12.1 8.4 
95% CI [21.1, 21.8] [27.2, 28.1] [11.9, 12.3] [8.2, 8.5] 
     
Number of Person-Years 6625 2036 6625 6468 
     
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 3.7666 4.4039 2.087 1.4516 
 (1.2696) (1.6207) (0.7003) (0.7566) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions) 16.2 18.9 9.0 6.2 
95% CI [15.9, 16.5] [18.6, 19.3] [8.8, 9.1] [6.1, 6.4] 
 VSL - using average hours 18.4 21.5 10.2 7.1 
95% CI [18.0, 18.8] [21.1, 21.9] [10.0, 10.4] [6.9, 7.3] 
     
Breusch-Pagan Test for 
Random Effects {p-value}   
2807 
{0.00}  
     
Hausman Test for Fixed –vs.- 
Random Effects {p-value}    
454 
{0.00} 
     
Number of Person-Years 5866 2012 5866 5728 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors for the pooled times series 
cross-section estimator and the first difference estimator are robust to heteroskedasticity and within 
industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years of 
schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, state, and 
year effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 
1,000. 95% Confidence Intervals are constructed based on a 1st order Taylor series expansion. 
 
  
 
Table 8: Specification Checks for First-Difference Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk 
Tradeoff 
 
First Difference 
Estimates using 
Lagged Fatality 
Rates 
First-Difference 
Estimates with 
Industry 
Dummies 
First-Difference 
Estimates with 
Untrimmed 
Fatality Rates 
First-Difference 
Estimates Using 
Alternative Trim 
Horizon 
       
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.1611 1.3455 1.4281 1.4988 
 (0.5356) (0.5136) (0.4253) (0.4332) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions) 5.1 5.8 6.3 6.6 
95% CI [4.9, 5.2] [5.7, 5.9] [6.2, 6.4] [6.5, 6.7] 
 VSL - using average hours 5.8 6.6 7.2 7.5 
95% CI [5.7, 5.9] [6.5, 6.8] [7.1, 7.4] [7.4, 7.7] 
     
Number of Person-Years 4406 4338 5242 4916 
     
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 0.7777 1.4107 1.7186 1.9304 
 (0.5553) (0.6050) (0.5366) (0.5729) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions) 3.5 6.2 7.6 8.3 
95% CI [3.4, 3.6] [6.1, 6.3] [7.5, 7.7] [8.2, 8.5] 
 VSL - using average hours 4.0 7.1 8.7 9.5 
95% CI [3.9, 4.2] [6.9, 7.3] [8.5, 8.9] [9.3, 9.7] 
Number of Person-Years 
    
3695 4916 5242 4338 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years of 
schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, state, and year 
effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are constructed based on a 1st order Taylor series expansion. For the alternative 
trim horizon person-years are dropped from the annual fatality rate equation if the three-year average 
fatality rate exceeds positive 300 percent or negative 75 percent; likewise person-years are dropped 
from the three-year average fatality rate equation if the annual fatality rate exceeds positive 300 percent 
or negative 75 percent. 
  
 
Table 9: Specification Checks for Instrumental Variables Estimates of Wage-Fatal 
Risk Tradeoff 
  
First-Difference 
IV Estimator, t−2 
and t−3  Fatality 
as Instruments 
First-Difference 
IV Estimator, 
Lag Differenced 
Fatality as 
Instrument 
First-Difference 
IV Estimator, 
t−2 and t−4  
Fatality as 
Instruments 
First-Difference IV 
Estimator, Lag 
Differenced 
Fatality as 
Instrument 
     
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 2.0237 2.019 1.6134 1.589 
 (0.7849) (0.7845) (0.7498) (0.7496) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions) 8.7 8.7 7.1 7.0 
95% CI [8.6, 8.9] [8.5, 8.9] [6.9, 7.3] [6.8, 7.2] 
 VSL - using average hours 10.0 10.0 8.2 8.1 
95% CI [9.8, 10.2] [9.7, 10.2] [8.0, 8.4] [7.8, 8.3] 
     
First Stage Results     
     
t−2 fatality rate 0.6994    
 (0.0134)    
     
t−3 fatality rate -0.7019    
 (0.0132)    
     
(t−2 rate) − (t−3 rate)  0.7008   
  (0.0122)   
     
t−2 fatality rate   0.6476  
   (0.0155)  
     
t−4 fatality rate   -0.6570  
   (0.0141)  
     
(t−2 rate) − (t−4 rate)    0.6537 
    (0.0135) 
     
R2 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 
     
Number of Person-Years 4338 4338 3235 3235 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years of 
schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, state, and year 
effects. First stage regressions include all exogenous explanatory variables in addition to the noted 
instruments. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are constructed based on a 1st order Taylor series expansion. 
 
  
 
Table 10: Arellano-Bond Dynamic First Difference Estimates of Wage-
Fatal Risk Tradeoff 
  Dynamic First-Difference Estimates 
  with lag differenced wage instrumented 
      
  Short-Run Effect Long-Run Effect 
    
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000  1.9094 2.2893 
  (0.9150) [0.039] 
    
Implied VSL ($Millions)  8.6 10.4 
95% CI  [8.4, 8.9] [10.1, 10.7] 
 VSL - using average hours  9.9 11.9 
95% CI  [9.7, 10.3] [11.5, 12.3] 
    
Number of Person-Years  2788 
    
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000  1.7056 2.1563 
  (0.9050) [0.062] 
    
Implied VSL ($Millions)  7.9 9.9 
95% CI  [7.6, 8.1] [9.7, 10.2] 
 VSL – using average hours  9 11.4 
95% CI  [8.8, 9.3] [11.1, 11.7] 
    
Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions 
Test-Annual Fatality {p-value}  
79.78 
{0.16}  
    
Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions 
Test-3-Year Fatality {p-value}  
88.96 
{0.05}  
    
Number of Observations   3162 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses and p-values of the null hypothesis that 
the long-run effect is zero are recorded in square brackets. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls 
for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, 
race, one-digit occupation, state, and year effects. One and two year lags of the independent 
variables, except for the fatality rates, are included as instruments for the lag wage. To 
construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are constructed based on a 1st order Taylor series expansion. 
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